The Social Account of Humour by Abrahams, Daniel
 1 
This is a draft of the paper to be printed in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Cite that 
copy once it’s out, obviously. 
 
The Social Account of Humour  





Philosophical accounts of humour standardly account for humour in terms of what happens 
within a person. On these internalist accounts, humour is to be understood in terms of 
cognition, perception, and sensation. These accounts, while valuable, are poorly-situated to 
engage the social functions of humour. They have difficulty engaging why we value humour, 
why we use it define ourselves and our friendships, and why it may be essential to our self-
esteem. In opposition to these internal accounts, I offer a social account of humour. This 
account approaches humour as a social practice. It foregrounds laughter and participation, 
and thereby gives an account of humour that helps to understand why we value humour, 





The Social Account of Humour 
 
The dominant philosophical accounts of humour understand it by what happens within the 
person: by a cognition, or a sensation, or a perception. Noel Carroll (2014a), for instance, 
understands humour by way of the cognitive emotion of comic amusement, which is aimed 
at the formal object of something that is perceived as incongruous (4, 55-7). John Morreall 
(2009) provides the cognitive shift theory, which understands humour by way of the 
sensation felt during certain shifts from one cognitive state to another (63). Matthew Hurley 
et al (2011) suggest that humour is to be understood through the epistemic emotion of 
mirth, which is rooted in a cognitive mechanism for identifying and resolving incompatible 
committed beliefs (66, 116, 240). While these accounts have their virtues, they are all 
limited by staying within the body. But humour is also a social phenomenon. It involves how 
we engage the world, how we interact with each other, and what we value. These are issues 
that cannot be addressed by looking at how humour makes us feel. They are fundamentally 
social questions involving how we do humour.  
 
Opposite the internalist accounts, I provide what I call the social account of humour. This 
holds that humour is a social practice, which is to say that humour is fundamentally 
something that people do. Specifically, I suggest that humour is a practice centred on 
evoking laughter. Accordingly, this account gives a prominence to laughter, and so runs 
contrary to the internalist accounts, which tend to minimize laughter’s importance. This 
paper will be devoted to articulating and justifying the social account, and not to arguing 
against the internalist accounts. This is the social account can happily cohabit with an 
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internalist account, though I believe that the social account is ultimately more interesting 
and more useful. 
 
My paper contains three sections. The first is dedicated to developing the account. I explain 
what the account is and offer some finesses to address immediate concerns. Section two 
defends the social account with respect to the foregrounding of practice and the 
foregrounding of laughter. Here I appeal to the diversity of humour practice and suggest 
that what unifies them is the pursuit of laughter. Lastly, I consider the applications of the 
account. This section shows both the account’s usefulness in understanding the social role 
played by humour, and how it makes available new philosophical avenues. 
 
I. The Account Explained 
 
I hold that humour is a practice centred on evoking laughter. Understanding humour as a 
practice means understanding it primarily as something that people do. A practice may be 
as wide as absurd humour or as narrow as my uncle’s game of attaching clothes pegs to 
unsuspecting victims. In this section I elaborate this basic account, and present three basic 
success conditions I believe this account provides. I begin by briefly elaborating what it 
means to say that humour is “centred on” laughter, and that laughter must be “evoked.” 
 
Evoking laughter is at the core of humour practice, but particular humour practices have 
developed in such a way that laughter is less important to them. These practices may de-
emphasize humour in different ways. Some humour, like literary humour, tends to be 
engaged with alone. Research suggests that humans laugh far more readily in social 
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situations, and so will laugh far less when reading alone (Provine and Fischer 1989, 301). 
Nevertheless, literary humour developed out of humour practices based on getting people 
to laugh (such as storytelling, jokes, and singing). The literary humourist is doing something 
that developed to evoke laughter. Similarly, there exist humour practices like disgust 
humour that pursue reactions other than laughter. As with literary humour, these 
developed out of humour practices based on getting people to laugh (for example practical 
jokes and transgressive humour). I suggest that if these practices could not be tied back to a 
practice of evoking laughter then they would be less readily considered humour. Laughter is 
at the core of humour, but particular humour practices have developed in directions that 
pursue other reactions. Acts from particular humour practices that standardly pursue 
laughter may be used for purposes which do not pursue laughter. Just as a statue may be 
used as a weapon against a home invader, a joke may be utilized as an insult with no 
concern for aesthetic appreciation.  I will defend the centrality of laughter in the next 
section. 
 
To write that the humour seeks to “evoke laughter” is to hold that the goal of humour, 
broadly construed, is to bring about the laughter of the audience. Some theories of humour 
hold that specific sorts of laughter are humour-appropriate, and other sorts are not. At the 
far end is the theory of Hurley et al (2011), which speculates that all humour-appropriate 
laughter is Duchenne laughter, which is laughter characterized by a furrowed brow and 
upturned corners of the mouth, and is considered particularly difficult to falsely imitate (19). 
I want the social account to allow any sort of evoked laughter to be humour appropriate, 
and I will defend this position in the next section. The second clarification is that to say the 
laughter has to be evoked is just to close off issues related to pathological laughter, deviant 
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causation, or performed laughter responding to stage directions.1 I want to leave what 
counts as properly evoked laughter open-ended and sensitive to particular humour 
practices. In particular, the theory allows that in mass-audience settings individual audience 
members’ laughter is often evoked by the laughter of others. Tickling is not conventionally a 
humour practice but it is not in principle excluded by the social account, and could qualify 
under different cultural circumstances. 
 
The social practice of humour includes different roles. First there is the humourist, who 
performs the humour act.  Opposite the humourist is the audience, whose laughter is 
pursued by the humourist. Then there is the laughable, which is the subject of the laughter. 
In a lot of humour the laughable is the butt of the joke, but not all humour has butts, so the 
laughable is worth considering as a role independently of the butt. These roles may be filled 
by the same person. All three roles might be played by the same person, in the case of 
someone doing self-deprecating humour for themselves. These roles enable us to identify 
three basic success conditions for humour, which support a distinctive aesthetics of 
humour. Attempts at humour that excel by these conditions are better as humour and are 
thereby be considered funnier. Attempts which are inferior by these conditions are worse as 
humour and are thereby considered less funny, or even not funny at all. 
1. Comprehensibility: For a humour act to succeed it must be comprehensible to the 
audience. 
2. Participation: For a humour act to succeed, the audience must participate as 
prescribed.  
 
1 “Deviant causation” includes things like drug use or electrically stimulating the brain. It does not include the 
use of laugh tracks, which are a regular component of some humour practices. 
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3. Plurality: Different humour practices may have their own standards for success, 
which must be met in addition to Comprehensibility and Participation. 
 
The comprehensibility condition captures that, since humour is a practice, the audience 
should recognize that the act in question is an act performed within this particular practice. 
This means that recognize that what the humourist is doing is humour, and respond to it as 
such. Note that this condition holds that the act must be comprehensible and not that the 
act must be comprehended. These conditions are for a normative, not descriptive, 
evaluation of the humour act. If, for example, I fail to recognize that my friend has told a 
perfectly good joke because I am daydreaming, that failure belongs to me and not the 
humour act. 
 
Participation captures the fact that humour pursues particular responses. These are 
standardly but not necessarily laughter. We have already seen that particular humour 
practices have developed to pursue reactions like consternation or disgust. Framing this 
success condition as “participation” also acknowledges that the audience, by reacting, are 
fulfilling their role as audience. This allows for cases where humour is worse because the 
people being courted as audience by the humourist ought to reject their role as audience. 
This will prove significant in the later section on ethical evaluation. 
 
Lastly, plurality captures that there are myriad particular humour practices, and many come 
with their own particular standards. Puns, for example, require a similarity between either 
different words or different concepts. An attempt at a pun that fails to achieve that 
similarity fails as a pun. Gross-out humour that fails to be disgusting fails as gross-out 
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humour. The plurality condition allows the social account to fit with different popular 
theories of humour, like incongruity or superiority. The adherent to the social account may 
allow that these are just different approaches to humour, without having to commit to one 
of them reigning supreme. The plurality condition also manages cases where humour 
succeeds according to one condition but fails according to another. Consider “hack” jokes, 
which draw laughter but are otherwise considered inferior.2 The joke may be strong by the 
participation condition but considered poor by a practice-specific criterion (perhaps to do 
with demonstrating the skill or creativity of the humourist). 
 
I.I Points of Finesse 
 
Before moving to the defence of the social account, there are two small points to finesse. 
The first is how to understand what I call “found humour.” There are many things regularly 
called funny — an oddly-shaped potato, someone falling down a manhole and dying — that 
are not performed by a humourist but just encountered in the wild. Since these things are 
intuitively funny despite the absence of any humourist, there is the question of how the 
social account accommodates them. My position is that instances of found humour are 
appreciated by socially-learned ways of engaging humour. The found object or event is 
engaged by a subject in the ways that they have learned to engage humour. I believe this 
move can be made at no cost. Psychological research suggests that whether or not subjects 
find something funny depends on whether or not they are primed to believe that that thing 
is intended as humour (Martin and Ford 2018, 64). This research applies just as much to 
 
2 I thank an anonymous referee for this example. 
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internalist accounts as it does to the social account. This means that internalist accounts 
must also permit that how funny something is may depend, in part, on whether it is 
engaged as humour. Accordingly, in this case, the social account does not demand the 
invention of anything new. I will discuss engaging humour as something socially learned 
more in section II.III. 
 
The second point of finesse is in properly understanding who the audience is. There are 
forms of what might be called guerilla humour, where their performance involves exploiting 
an unwilling audience. Practical jokes are paradigmatic of this sort of comedy. Andy 
Kaufman became famous for bewildering his audience, and Eric Andre has a very successful 
talk show centred on embarrassing and unnerving unsuspecting guests. In each of these 
cases, it seems like the humour does not actually pursue the participation of the audience. 
Andy Kaufman is not trying to get the people watching him to laugh, he is trying to bewilder 
them. In cases like these, it is important to be clear that the audience that is relevant to the 
humour act is not always the same as the audience which is immediately watching the 
performance of the humour act. The humour-relevant audience for Eric Andre are not the 
upset and unnerved riders of the New York Subway who are watching him pour Froot Loops 
and milk on himself, but a later audience who understand and appreciate what he is doing.  
 
II.I The Account Defended: The Tension between The Social Account and Actually Existing 
Internalist Accounts 
 
The social account’s treatment of laughter is at odds with existing internalist accounts. The 
dominant internalist theories of humour sideline laughter on the grounds that laughter is 
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neither necessary nor sufficient to humour (Shaw 2010, 113). At most laughter is typical, 
and the laughter that is appropriate to humour is of a certain type. To show that laughter is 
not necessary, theorists appeal to the fact that laughter is primarily a social signal with the 
result that people who are not in social situations seldom laugh at the things they find 
humorous; research from Robert Provine and Kenneth Fischer (1989) suggests that laughter 
is thirty times more frequent in social settings (301). On the point that laughter is not 
sufficient, theorists appeal to humour-inapt laughter. I have already mentioned that Hurley 
et al (2011) speculate that only Duchenne laughter is humour appropriate (19). Carroll 
(2013) does not appeal to Duchenne laughter directly but also rules out certain types of 
laughter such as the triumphant, the joyous, the nervous, and that which derives from 
recognition (78-79). 
 
Internalists may drive the separation between humour and laughter further by appealing to 
neurological evidence. Hurley et al (2011) cite research that laughter runs on its own 
neurological circuitry, separate from anything they consider to define humour (21-22). The 
association between humour and laughter, on this account, has developed over time 
through habituation. Morreall (2009) tells a similar story: laughter was originally a safety 
signal that encouraged relaxation, and early humans developed ways of exploiting this 
response to produce the pleasurable cognitive shifts that define humour (44-45). In both of 
these cases, internal phenomena are prioritized. Humour is defined by Hurley et al’s 
neurological circuitry or Morreall’s cognitive shift, and laughter is humour-apt insofar as it 
can be associated with these internal phenomena. 
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The social account, as I have formulated it, is in tension with these accounts. All of Carroll, 
Morreall, and Hurley et al only allow some laughter to be humour-apt, and the humour-
aptness of laughter is determined by some or other internal phenomena. The social account 
allows humour to trade on any sort of evoked laughter. To the extent that it is true that 
different types of laughter correspond to different internal phenomena, the social account 
of humour accepts as humour acts which would not be classified as humorous under 
existing internalist accounts. On the social account, humour that trades on triumphant 
laughter or joyous laughter is just as much humour as that which trades on what Carroll 
would consider comically amused laughter.  
 
I turn to a brief historical survey on humour practices. These historical examples show 
practices which should be expected to trade on different types of laughter, and possess 
different success conditions. These examples are at odds with existing internalist theories 
and I take them to support prioritizing laughter in an analysis of humour. While it is 
nevertheless possible that humour ultimately possesses some unifying internal phenomena, 
the breadth of actual historical practice still serves as reason for an account of humour to 
prioritize what people do over what is going on in their body.  
 
II.II The Account Defended: Defending the Centrality of Laughter to the Practice of Humour 
 
My claim is that, historically, humour practice has sought to evoke laughter from a desired 
target. The best way to support this claim is to present varied humour practices and show 
that, while all of them pursued laughter, they otherwise operated according to very 
different standards. Accordingly, I will present an overview of different historical and 
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contemporary humour practices. To be clear, these examples are not presented as 
paradigmatic examples of humour. Rather, these examples are meant to show the breadth 
of humour practice. 
 
Four examples may be drawn from the anthology A Cultural History of Humour (1997).3 The 
first two are drawn from ancient Greece. The gelotopoios was a vagrant humourist who 
would be invited to the dinners of rich patrons with the purpose of making the dinner 
guests laugh (Bremmer 1997, 13-14). Historical record shows that the gelotopoios (literally 
“laughter producer”) had three main tricks for evoking laughter: jokes, mimicry, and flattery 
(ibid). While jokes and mimicry have presence as modern humour techniques, flattery 
stands out as something that is quite different from any present day practice. This 
difference is relevant as, in the context of ancient Greece, these three things — jokes, 
mimicry, and flattery — were considered part of the same practice: the gelotopoios 
producing the laughter of the dinner guests.  
 
The medieval era provides examples of humour which was importantly mediated by the 
social position of the participants. Atop the political hierarchy was the concept of the Rex 
Facetus (LeGoff 1997, 44). This idea held that humour was only proper when coming from 
and being directed by the king (Ibid). The rest of the royal court was required to stay 
 
3 Something worth noting about historical cases is that broad examples are very hard to come by. This is for 
two reasons. The first one, which is widely acknowledged, is that there is simply very little historical work on 
humour practices. The second one is that, since there is very little recording of humour practices, what has 
survived tends to be of particular forms which are apt for historical survival. This means that most surviving 
historical humour is in the form of texts and images, which means that historical examples will tend towards 
the forms of humour for which texts and images are most apt. This anthology, so far as I can tell, is the only 
historical work that focuses on what people actually did. 
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humbled and in control of their emotions, respecting the superiority of king and God (Ibid).4 
At the opposite end of the political hierarchy was the “gab,” the trading of banter and tall 
stories for the purpose of generating laughter (49). The gab was also hierarchically 
mediated, but in this case what was important was that the participants were equals. In 
each case, what is important is that the success or failure of the particular humour practices 
depended on the hierarchical standing of the participants.  
 
Finally there is the beffa from early-modern Italy. The beffa was a sort of practical joke 
where the goal was to make someone vulnerable and exploit them, usually by covering 
them in bodily fluids (Burke 1997, 67).5 Beffe could also function as a source of competition 
between people who were equal within civil society, and the goal was to feel schadenfreude 
at the victim’s suffering (66). This makes the beffa an interesting contrast with the medieval 
humour practices. Both are intertwined with social power, but where the Rex Facetus and 
the gab followed already-existing social lines, beffe worked to create power of the joker 
over the victim. 
 
These four historical examples are diverse. They are variegated both by activity and 
standards of success. What unites the practices is that they all demonstrate practices which, 
 
4 Similar phenomena of hierarchically-defined divisions of humour labour have been found in contemporary 
studies looking at gender dynamics. A study by Robert Provine (2000) found that men looking for a woman 
“with a sense of humour” were more often looking for someone to laugh at their jokes, whereas women 
looking for a man “with a sense of humour” were more often looking for someone to make them laugh (30-
33).  
5 Two examples: “In a story told by Sabadino (no.16), a craftsman goes to the barber to be shaved and sees 
that the barber’s shoes are very large. ‘He felt an urge to piss in them’ (li venne voglia de urinarli dentro), and 
he does so. In a story by Bandello (1.35), Madonna Cassandra has an affair with a friar, the husband discovers, 
dresses as the friar, takes laxative pills and shits all over her in the bed.” While these are stories, and not 
accounts, they may be taken as representative of the spirit of the beffa even if they may be more extreme 
than any practical jokes that were actually executed.  
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at one point or another, involve laughter. It is worth noting that none of these records make 
a note of exactly what kind of laughter was being pursued. This does not exclude the 
possibility that different practitioners pursued particular sorts of laughter but it does mean 
that, from the historical record, one thing that the practices have in common is the pursuit 
of laughter in general.  
 
A similar prioritization of laughter may also be found in the contemporary practice of 
humour. For example, take how stand-up comedian Kevin Hart develops his routines. When 
he performs his sets, he has his friends sit in the audience and record how other audience 
members are reacting (Hart 2019). After the show, his friends provide him notes on how he 
did; Hart provides the example “you got a big laugh, try to play with that more” (Ibid).  He 
develops his act through repeated performances and refinements, with the stated goal of 
presenting the material “in a way where anyone can laugh” (Ibid). While Hart does not 
explicitly say he is pursuing any particular sort of laughter, he does mention choosing 
different audience reactions “to hold on to” (Ibid).  
 
What Hart’s account of his own practice brings to the forefront is that laughter is what he 
uses to refine his material. It is how he judges whether or not he is succeeding, and he alters 
his act in accordance with whether or not people are laughing. This does not hold only for 
Hart: since laughter is how the audience shows their appreciation of humour, it is what the 
humourist has to guide the development of their practice. To the extent that humour is 
something that people do, laughter is the central part of knowing whether they are doing it 
right. Since laughter is the response that identifies whether or not the practice has been 
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performed correctly, the practice should be expected to develop in such a way so as to 
pursue that affirming response. 
 
II.III The Account Defended: Reasons to Prefer Foregrounding Practice 
 
I have suggested that an account of humour should be centred on laughter. Now I turn to 
defending regarding humour as a social practice, rather than something defined by internal 
phenomena. To achieve this, I turn to examples which underline how humour behaviour is 
learned. Internalists may appeal to the fact that humour comes easily and naturally as a 
reason to prefer an internalist account. While humour does come easily, this does not mean 
that it is fundamentally an internal phenomenon. By analogy, humans have a natural 
predisposition towards language: we have brain circuitry which allows for language’s 
development, acquisition, and use. However, it is not the case that language just is the 
product of that circuitry. And humans do not just speak “language” in general, but speak 
particular languages which they learn and over which they have different levels of mastery. 
Similarly, even if there is brain circuitry which underlies humour, that does not mean that 
that brain circuitry determines what humour is. As the following examples show, humour is 
something that people learn how to do both as humourist and as audience. That humour is 
something that people have to learn how to do is a good reason to foreground just what 
people are doing when understanding humour. 
 
Internalists relegate laughter to being a common but unnecessary accompaniment to 
humour (Hurley et al 2011, 23; Shaw 2010, 113; Morreall 2009, 44-45). On these accounts, 
laughter is connected to humour by being an expression or result of the humour-defining 
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internal process. However, the story is not that simple. There is good reason to believe that 
laughter is a socially-learned behaviour. As the research of Sauter et al (2018) shows, human 
infants laugh on both the inhale and exhale, and learn to laugh only on the exhale with 
experience (1840). Sauter et al note this supports not just that laughter develops as part of 
vocal maturation, but also social learning about when and how to laugh (ibid). We learn how 
to play the role of audience. And, following research conducted by Gina Mireault et al 
(2012), not only are activities like laughing, teasing, and clowning fundamental to parent-
infant interactions, but these activities are performed in the context of explicit instruction 
about what is and is not humorous (345). This is all to say that how we laugh does not just 
come naturally, but is learned. Laughter being a socially-learned behaviour means that it is 
not simply a straightforward reaction representing some more fundamental humour-
defining internal process. 
 
Laughter may also have to be re-learned. Laughter has gendered expectations, and there 
are cases where people either choose to or are forced to learn to laugh in a more gender-
appropriate manner. Consider a blog post made by Christie Block (2014), owner and 
operator of the New York Speech & Voice Lab, titled “Laughing in a More Feminine or 
Masculine Way.” The post is written for people who have transitioned either from living as a 
man to a woman or a woman to a man and now find that their laugh does not match their 
gender. Block notes that louder, less controlled laughter is considered more masculine, 
whereas female laughter is expected to be quieter, higher-pitched, and more controlled. As 
a speech therapist, Block offers services to help people train themselves to laugh in one way 
or the other. While Block is specifically offering services to people who are transitioning, she 
did not invent gendered norms of behaviour. As the popular term “unladylike laugh” 
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suggests, gendered laughter (especially female gendered laughter) has a norm of propriety 
which connotes having learned some sort of well-mannered behaviour.6 Altogether, the 
gendering of laughter shows another case where laughter is a socially-learned behaviour. 
Learning gender-appropriate laughter is part of learning how to play the role of gender-
appropriate humour audience. 
 
Humour is also something that people have to learn to do. As infants, babies learn clowning 
behaviour from their parents or caregivers, and mimic such behaviour while using laughter 
and smiling as responses signalling they are doing the right sort of thing. Other research by 
Mireault et al (2015) shows that this applies not only to positive reinforcement but also 
negative reinforcement: parental non-responses to clowning behaviour seem to reduce 
humour reactions in more mature infants (38). I suggest that research such as that done by 
Mireault et al supports the idea that infants are learning a practice. They are experimenting 
with different forms of activity, and keeping the ones that garner a positive response while 
rejecting the ones that do not. A similar point can be extracted from examining jokes 
written by children. The group Kids Write Jokes collects submissions from adults of 
children’s attempts at writing jokes that do not quite succeed as regular jokes. What is 
relevant about these submissions is that there are many which demonstrate a familiarity 
with the form of joking but lack an understanding of the content of joking.7 Even if the kids 
do not quite understand just what they are doing, they are still imitating the form of joking. 
The joke may not make sense, but it still carries the form of, for example, a question and 
 
6 One way of understanding Quentin Skinner’s argument in “Why Laughing Mattered in the Renaissance” 
(2001) is that modern theories of humour in fact originated in medicalizing socially-improper laughter. 
7A typical example: “Why can’t Cinderella play football? She is posh.” 
https://twitter.com/KidsWriteJokes/status/1248536433851338753, April 30 
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answer joke or a knock-knock joke. Altogether, people learn humour by learning to do 
humour. Ways of understanding, interacting with, and performing humour do not simply 
issue forth from our biological or psychological nature, but are to at least some degree 
socially learned. Since humour is inextricably a social activity, an account that understands 
humour as a social activity should be preferred.  
 
In this section I have defended the social account of humour on the grounds that it 
appropriately makes laughter central to the practice of humour and that humour behaviour 
is significantly socially learned. Even if there is a unifying set of internal phenomena, the 
social account is preferable because it better tracks that humour is something that people 
do. In the next section, I further this defence by applying the social account to show its 
explanatory strengths. 
 
III.I The Account Applied: What Does the Social Account Let You Do? 
 
The first explanatory virtue of the social account of humour is covered in section II.II, which 
is that the social account is good at engaging questions about humour behaviour. The 
research of Mireault et al, is based on research by Vasudevi Reddy (2001), which focused on 
categorizing humour behaviour. Reddy’s focus on humour as a fundamentally social 
behaviour has helped develop research into cognitive development. However, I believe that 
the social account offers explanatory virtues more bold than simply supplementing or 
facilitating psychological research. 
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One subject the social account lends itself well to is the role of humour in society. When 
internalist accounts bring up the use of humour it is usually in the form of mockery.8 
However, they do so with an eye to the question of whether mocking behaviour can be 
reduced to an internalist account of what humour is. The social account, on the other hand, 
provides a rich framework for understanding the role of humour in society, and this 
framework helps elucidate particular forms of humour like mockery. It is able to accomplish 
this through the priority given to laughter. 
 
An important tool for the social account of humour is the distinction between “affiliative” 
and “disaffiliative” laughter (Glenn 2003, 29). Laughter is a social signal, so it may be used to 
identify and negotiate group memberships and power dynamics (Glenn, 26). Affiliative 
laughter is laughter that creates or attempts to create an alignment between the laugher 
and others (Glenn, 29). Disaffiliative laughter either represents or attempts to create group 
boundaries such that these boundaries fall between the laugher and at least some others 
(Glenn, 31). This distinction is loosely similar to the colloquial distinction between “laughing 
with” and “laughing at.” This distinction between affiliative and disaffiliative laughter helps 
understand not only ways in which humour is used, but also why it is significant. 
 
Understanding humour as a social practice helps to understand the power of mockery. 
Making fun of someone does not merely manifest a disapproval of whatever is being 
mocked, the disaffiliative laughter works to actively exclude the person being targeted.9 
 
8 In particular, contemporary internalists will invoke Henri Bergson’s “mechanical account” of humour, which 
holds that humour developed as a reaction against mechanical, inflexible behaviour, as a valuable datum to be 
explained. 
9 I note that the exercise of power is part of the humour itself, and not merely an exogenous result of the 
laughter. Thanks to the editor for suggesting clarification on this point. 
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Even if the target does not necessarily care about the standards or approval of the laughter, 
they may still feel the sting of exclusion. This also helps explain not only why the target can 
reply to mockery by trying to laugh along, but why laughing along can work to defuse the 
mockery. As Dorte Marie Søndegaard (2018) notes, laughing along performs three tasks 
simultaneously: it can be an attempt by the target to reestablish some agency, it attempts 
to ingratiate the target into the laugher’s group, and through that attempted ingratiation it 
can work as a kind of supplication (52). These are all ways of the victim attempting to use 
laughter defuse the power exercise of the mockery. Indeed, the social account helps 
understand where mockery crosses the line into bullying. Bullying is not just using humour 
to hurt people, but rather may be understood as a humour practice unto itself where one of 
its constitutive elements — part of what makes bullying succeed on its own terms — is an 
exercise of power (where that exercise of power also meets the comprehensibility and 
participation conditions). The social account helps understand how the humour and harm of 
bullying are intertwined on a fundamental level, and how this can lead to the victim being 
blamed for their own suffering. As Søndegaard (2018) notes, many instances of bullying 
culminate in the verdict that the victim just does not have a sense of humour (58). That the 
victim did not find the bullying funny does not matter, because the practice of bullying does 
not pursue the laughter of the victim. It pursues the bully’s enjoyment of the exercise of 
power. The victim’s suffering and humiliation is, if anything, one of the particular practice’s 
success conditions.  
 
Approaching laughter as something that manages group boundaries also helps explain why 
affiliative laughter can feel alienating. Consider the anecdote told by Peter Kivy at the end of 
“Jokes Are a Laughing Matter” (2003), where the laughter of the established philosophers at 
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the American Philosophical Association made him feel “lonely, left out, and, indeed, 
repulsed” (14). Grant that the remembered philosophers are laughing affiliatively amongst 
themselves. This affiliative laughter signals not only to the laughers but also to onlookers 
that they are together as a group. And, to the onlooker like Kivy, it may signal that the 
onlooker is not part of the group. The onlooker is excluded, and feels that viscerally. 
 
These dynamics of affiliation and disaffiliation, inclusion and exclusion, also help explain 
why a sense of humour is so cherished. In contemporary Western society, to be good at 
humour is to be powerful and carry social value. The ability to make people laugh is not just 
to bring people joy, but the ability to bring together and manage the boundaries of a social 
group. In this context, a sense of humour is a measure of social power. It is easy to imagine 
that if humour is how one manages the bonds of one’s closest friendships, then there might 
be a connection between the quality of one’s humour and the quality of one’s friends.10 A 
denigration of one’s sense of humour, then, is easily felt as a condemnation of one’s social 
group and social value. Along similar lines, the social account can help understand the 
prominence of the “politically incorrect” canard in both reactionary humour and reactionary 
violence. This pejorative notion of political correctness covers, among many other things, 
the belief that humourists’ earned laughter is being denied for political reasons. This denied 
laughter can be understood as denied affiliation. The threat of political correctness to 
humour in this sense is that the humourist’s exercise of power, this attempted act of 
affiliation, is frustrated.11 
 
 
10 Recall the previously-cited Provine (2000) study on the importance of laughter and making-laugh in dating. 
11 Provine (2000) is relevant here again.  
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Accusations of political correctness are not the only places that cultural concerns around 
humour arise. Consider the notion that Donald Trump lacks a sense of humour (Young 2019, 
137-139). The social account helps understand part of why this claim would be made: if 
Trump is a poor humourist then affiliating with him is less merited.12 Similarly, the humour 
of Saturday Night Live has become a lodestar for a certain strand of American liberal 
political opposition. Comedians like Hannah Gadsby and Shane Gillis are either legitimated 
or delegitimated based on the ethical content of their comedy. I will discuss ethical 
evaluation shortly. For now it is enough to say that the social account helps understand why 
we engage Gadsby and Gillis as we do. Putting them in a prominent position involves 
putting them in positions to manage and define group boundaries.13 
 
Altogether, the social account provides a framework that is good at engaging with questions 
about how humour is used and why it is valued. In particular, the distinction between 
affiliative and disaffiliative laughter helps the social account make sense of how humour is 
used to manage boundaries and social relationships. While these explanatory virtues 
support the social account of humour, they ultimately point towards investigative lines in 
disciplines beyond philosophy. I want to now turn to two particular philosophical directions 
the social account makes available. 
 
III.II The Account Applied: Where Does the Social Account Let You Go? 
 
 
12 The social account also helps explain why this notion is wrong: Trump’s role is not to laugh but to tell the 
joke that makes others laugh. This affirms his hierarchical position; it is for others to affiliate with him. 
13 In this context, the social account of humour helps connect the politics of humour with Lilliana Mason’s 
(2018) research showing that American politics increasingly operates along lines of affective polarization.  
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One philosophical strength of the social account is that, by analyzing humour in terms of 
roles, it allows for humour to be examined from different perspectives. Philosophical 
analyses of humour have tended to take on the position of the humourist or audience. 
Accordingly, humour is understood through positive emotions. Carroll (2014a), for instance, 
asserts that comic amusement is the paradigmatic emotion of humour and how humour 
should be understood (4). However, it would be strange to think of comic amusement to be 
paradigmatic of the experience of a person being laughed at. The social account permits 
humour as possibly having different paradigmatic emotions, depending on where one 
stands relative to the humour act. 
 
One possible paradigmatic emotion of humour is that of embarrassment or shame.14 
Embarrassment is connected to a feeling of having done wrong or in some essential way 
being wrong (Taylor 2002 [1985], 64). It seems to be critically connected to humour in at 
least two ways. The first is through the tendency of people to describe their own 
embarrassment as funny, and answering that they might have reacted with amusement had 
the embarrassment happened to someone else (Crozier 2014, 271). Amusement and 
embarrassment, in this context, are two sides of the same coin. What merits 
embarrassment also merits amusement, and whichever response is merited for a particular 
person depends on which place they occupy within the humour act.  
 
The second way that embarrassment may be connected to humour is through research on 
gelotophobia, which involves the fear that one is the subject of any laughter that one hears. 
 
14 The exact distinction between shame and embarrassment, or even if there is such a distinction, is unclear 
and contested. The precise boundary between the two is not relevant to this paper, so I use them 
interchangeably. 
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Michael Titze (2009) has shown that sufferers of gelotophobia are united by a persistent 
sense of shame (29). Shame being a paradigmatic emotion of humour would cohere well 
with Titze’s research. If someone overhears laughter and feels shame, then they are both 
perceiving evidence of a humour act and having an experience paradigmatic of humour. The 
gelotophobe both hears laughter and is having the experience of being laughed at, so the 
mistaken belief that she is being laughed at is understandable. This is not to say that shame 
and embarrassment are definitely paradigmatic emotions of humour, just that this is 
something the social account makes possible. 
 
Perhaps more philosophically significant is that the social account makes possible a new 
approach to the ethical evaluation of humour. I now present a brief overview of how such 
an account might work. 
 
Current philosophical accounts of the ethical evaluation of humour, such as those from 
Carroll (2014b, 241), Aaron Smuts (2009, 151), and Berys Gaut (1998, 53) all start from a 
place of internalism. Accordingly, what they are focused on is when humour’s ethical 
content either does or should block an emotional response. The social account offers 
different possibilities, including options which capture parts of lay discourse which 
internalist approaches do not. Consider the admonishment “that’s not funny,” directed to a 
child or peer that has laughed at a piece of racist humour. The social account could provide 
a way to understand this admonishment through the participation condition. 
 
Recall that the participation condition holds that for a humour act to succeed it must merit 
participation, where participation is standardly but not necessarily in the form of laughter. 
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In standard cases, if it is wrong to laugh at a humour act, then it is wrong to participate in 
the humour act as audience, and the humour act suffers accordingly. This makes the 
wrongness of laughing at a racist joke not just an inapt expression of amusement, but an 
inapt reaction to an unfunny-because-racist joke. Similarly, racist jokes are going to be 
reliably worse insofar as they are racist to the extent that that racism makes participation 
inappropriate. In turn, the admonishment “that’s not funny” does not have to be 
understood as loose speech, reprimanding a child merely for an inappropriate display of 
amusement. Rather, “that’s not funny” indicates that whatever was being laughed at is 
indeed not funny.  
 
The social account also allows for a different way of understanding how humour can have 
ethical content. Recall affiliative and disaffiliative laughter. This laughter not only signals 
group membership, but can be used to include or exclude people — either audience or 
laughable — from a group. This means that laughter can be used as an exercise of power. In 
turn, when a humourist makes a joke targeting someone as the laughable, they may be 
offering the audience to affiliate with the humourist against the laughable. What the 
humourist is attempting in some of these cases is to use his and his audience’s laughter to 
exercise power over the laughable. Indeed, Søndegaard’s (2018) research suggests that a 
dynamic such as this is fairly typical in bullying (51). Exercises of power are capable of 
causing harm, and so are ethically evaluable. If an attempted humour act is harmful, then 
one should not participate as audience. Indeed, the harmfulness of the act ought to repel 
participation. A humour act that repels participation is worse as a humour act, and is 
proportionately less funny. 
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Participation is not only improper if the laughable is present to directly suffer the exclusion 
of the laughter. Since humour can manage group boundaries, it can determine the nature 
and dynamics of the group. By determining who is in and who is out, humour helps to 
contribute to what defines a group’s members. As Michael Philips notes in “Racist acts and 
Racist Humour” (1984)  these smaller groups scale up to compose society more broadly 
(90). To participate in racist humour, then, helps create a racist group which, in its own little 
way, contributes to composing society more broadly. Since one ought not participate in 
creating racist groups, racist humour repels participation. Since racist humour repels 
participation, it is less funny for being racist.15 
 
The invocation of bullying suggests another strength of the social account in ethical 
evaluation. Internalist accounts typically focus on racist and sexist humour, and their 
accounts of ethical evaluation are built to address concerns surrounding group-based 
humour. The social account, while adept at dealing with the ethics of group-based humour, 
is also strong at dealing with the ethical evaluation of humour which does not track identity-
defining groups. By fitting well with bullying, the social account is well-situated to address 
possibly the most common and pervasive form of unethical humour. The social account also 
helps understand isolated incidents, where we overstep or go too far when joking with 
friends. Like hitting too hard during roughhousing, the social account helps to understand 
how playful banter can fail by getting too personal, or cutting too deeply. 
 
 
15 It is possible that many or even most attempts at a humour act will be morally repugnant in a way that 
repels participation and consequently harms the act aesthetically. This just means that it is very difficult to 
successfully execute the act in an aesthetically excellent way. Thanks to the editor for suggesting clarification 
on this point. 
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This is, ultimately, only a brief overview of what the social account can do with questions of 
ethical evaluation. It is not a full account, but I believe it is enough to show that it has 
significant explanatory value. Altogether, then, the social account of humour provides a way 
of thinking about humour that fits well with lay discourse about humour, helps explain lay 




In this paper I have provided an account of humour as a social practice. It holds that humour 
is a practice centred on evoking laughter. Humour acts are understood as involving a 
humourist, an audience, and a laughable. Acts succeed or fail based on whether they are 
comprehensible, whether they merit participation, and based on any standards which apply 
to specific humour practices. I have defended this account both on the grounds of 
foregrounding laughter and foregrounding practice. Foregrounding laughter is justified by 
appealing to diverse humour practices, and showing that the pursuit of laughter is what 
unites them. Foregrounding practice is justified by appealing to the fact that both creating 
and appreciating laughter is something that people learn to do. The social account is 
ultimately valuable both in what it explains and what it makes possible. The social account 
provides an account of humour that helps talk about humour as a social phenomenon. It 
takes humour out of the body and back into the world. This lets the social account of 
humour help explain not only how humour works, but why it is important.  Humour is an 
essential way that we interact with each other, relate to each other, and value each other. 
The social account of humour reflects that, and this lets us bring humour from inside the 
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